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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEX DISCRIMINATION-THE FEMALE
HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETE-Bucha v. Illinois High School Association,
351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. II. 1972).
In recent years women of varying ages and inclinations have sought
to be accorded equality and recognition in all arenas of life.' Perhaps the
newest and most interesting field in which women are competing for equality
and recognition is in the area of athletics. Today's young women realize
the benefits of athletic activity in developing physical and mental fitness, and

in preparing for collegiate and professional opportunities.

However, to-

day's young women also realize that there is a great disparity in the athletic
2
facilities and appropriations for males and females.
On the collegiate level women athletes are making great strides toward
the goal of implementing effective athletic programs as budgets, competitive
schedules and facilities are being increased.3 Commensurate increases, however, are not indicated on the high school level. 4 In high schools across the
nation females are still relegated to noncompetitive, nonconcentrated, intramural type programs. 5 Within this context, four recently rendered decisions are signficant in that they delineate the right of female high school
athletes to participate on male interscholastic athletic teams. The decision
which synthesizes and collates much of the prevailing judicial thought in
this area is Bucha v. Illinois High school Association.0
The Handbook for the Illinois High School Association enumerates
the following goals for the high school sports program: "to stress the
cultural values, the appreciations and skills involved in all interscholastic
activities, and to promote cooperation and friendship." '7 However, the
1. Gerber, "The Changing Female Image: A Brief Commentary on Sport Competition for Women," Journal of Health, Physical Education and Recreation, 59 (1971).
2. Id.
3. Chicago Tribune, November 5, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 1; November 6, 1972,
§ 3, at 3, col. 2; November 7, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 3; November 8, 1972, § 3, at 1,
col. 3, a series discussing sex discrimination in collegiate athletics indicating that in the
past year the appropriations for female athletics at Michigan State University increased
from three thousand to fifty thousand dollars per year.
4. Interview with Mr. Harold Trapp, Athletic Director of Niles Township High
School System, Skokie, Illinois on October 19, 1972. The net cost of the girls' athletic
program was $3,548 and expenditures for the boys' program were $47,495.
5. Gregorio v. Board of Education of Asbury Park N.J. Superior Court-Appellate Div., A-1277-70, April 5, 1971; Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic
Association, No. 12497 (Superior Ct. of Conn., New Haven County, 1971); found in
"Education: "Sports" Women's Rights Law Reporter, 1, (Spring 1972). See also
Harris v. Illinois High School Association, No. 72-25 (S.D. Ill. April 17, 1972).
6. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
7. Illinois High School Association Handbook, Article I.
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Association's by-laws, in a very real sense, subvert these goals. Females
are prohibited from participating in interscholastic sports activities in both
contact and noncontact sports.8 This by-law has recently been amended to
permit interscholastic activity in noncontact sports subject to certain restrictions emphasizing the intramural aspects of the sports. 9 Mixed competition in athletics between members of opposite sexes is completely prohibited.1 0
Because of these by-laws, Sandra Bucha, an accomplished female
swimmer at Hinsdale Township High School, was denied eligibility for
the male varsity interscholastic swimming team. In Bucha v. Illinois High
School Association, she argued that this denial of eligibility was a violation
of the fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection 1 and constituted a deprivation of a right for which civil redress is provided by 42 U.S.C.
1983.12 The suit was filed and accepted as a class action's seeking three
remedies: a determination that the IHSA by-laws are violative of equal

protection guarantees and thereby unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting
the enforcement of these by-laws; and twenty-five thousand dollars in damages.1 4 The court found no violation of equal protection concepts and
granted summary judgment for the defendant, the Illinois High School
Association.
The fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983 furnish the basis of a
claim for relief only when the questioned regulation can be construed to
be state action. No protection is afforded from the discriminatory practices
promulgated by private institutions or organizations.' 5 The defendant, IHSA,
8. Id. By-law A-11-14 (as amended): No school belonging to this Association

shall permit girls to participate in interscholastic athletic contests with the following
exceptions: Interscholastic contests in archery, badminton, bowling, fencing, golf,
gymnastics, swimming, tennis, and track and field may be permitted.
9. id. The restrictions for girls athletic programs include a prohibition on organized cheering, a one dollar limitation on the value of awards, and a prohibition on
overnight trips in conjunction with girls contests.
10. Id. There shall be no mixed athletic competition between boys and girls.
11. No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-

tection of the laws.
12. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1970): Every person who, under color of any state statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state or territory subjects or causes to
be subjected any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Prerequisites to a class action: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that the joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to all the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative are typical of the claims and defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
14. Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. See generally, Developments in the Law of Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev.

1065 (1969); Note Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Sex Based Classification,
1972 Wisc. L. Rev. 626 (1972).
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is a voluntary affiliation of Illinois high schools which is not directly funded
by the Illinois Department of Public Instruction. However, the activities
of voluntary high school associations like the IHSA have been adjudicated
to be actions taken under color of state law. 16 The requisite state action is
clearly manifested in that the very existence of the association is dependent
upon the support and cooperation of the public school system. The member schools are tax-supported institutions that cannot violate the rights of
their students without being subject to judicial review. Consequently, the
enforcement of the association rules by the member schools may have a
substantial impact on the rights of the students enrolled in these tax-supported institutions. This de facto state action is sufficient to warrant appli17
cation of the federal protections.
Three other significant decisions are illuminating in a discussion of the
Bucha case. Reed v. Nebraska High School Association,18 Brendan v.
Independent School District 742,19 and Haas v. South Bend Community
School Corporation2 0 reached a very different result from the Bucha decision, though not necessarily a different conclusion. These three cases
from neighboring jurisdictions were also predicated on the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees and 42 U.S.C. 1983.21 For purposes of
an effective analysis these cases may be juxtaposed with each other and
discussed as an integrated totality.
The Bucha opinion correctly noted that "when dealing with an alleged
denial of equal protection it is necessary first to define the nature of the
right asserted. '22 This is essential because judicially evolved precedents
indicate two distinct bases on which fourteenth amendment questions may
be analyzed. 23 The first basis may involve either a fundamental (constitutionally guaranteed or legislatively protected) right, or an inherently suspect (constitutionally offensive) classification that is invidiously discriminatory. Each will necessitate active judicial scrutiny 24 which tests the legislation, regulation, or classification by measuring it against the corresponding state interest. The infringement of a fundamental right or the utilization of an inherently suspect classification can only be upheld upon con-

16. Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th
Cir. 1970); Oklahoma High School Association v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.
1963).
17. See note 14 supra.
18. 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
19.

342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972).

20. 289 N.E.2d 495 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1972).
21. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation alleges a denial of the
Indiana Constitutional guarantee, Article I § 23. The General Assembly shall not
grant to any citizen privileges or immunities which upon the same terms not equally
belong to all.
22. Supra note 6, at 73.

23. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
24. See note 15 supra.
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clusive demonstation of a compelling state interest. 25 Conceptually, this
test is the synthesis of cases dealing with constitutional questions as varied
as the imposition of economic regulations and the right of free speech. 26
The second basis upon which fourteenth amendment questions may
be analyzed is employed in all other cases. Thus, cases that do not deal
with fundamental rights or invidious discrimination are subjected to permissive judicial review.2 7 This is a less stringent standard requiring that
the classification or legislation be well founded upon a rational basis that
is reasonably related to the objective intended.2
This type of permissive
review is utilized in the female athlete cases under discussion. The right to
participate in athletic activity is not considered fundamental and the use of
the sex classification is not inherently suspect as invidious discrimination.2 9
I.

PARTICIPATION IN INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS

Is

NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

The Supreme Court undisputedly indicates in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka8 0 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District3 1 that students are granted protection of fundamental rights
based on Constitutional guarantees or legislative provisions. Brown holds
that a public school student has a fundamental right to be free from racial
discrimination as effectuated by a de jure segregated school system. Tinker
holds that a school board cannot infringe upon a student's fundamental
right of free speech in the absence of a compelling state interest that necessitates the interference. These cases stand for the proposition that "the
Constitution does not stop at the public school door like a puppy waiting
for its master, but instead follows the student through the corridors and
into the classrooms." 32 However, it does not follow the student onto the
athletic field.
Federal courts have noted:
Only those rights secured by the Constitution or some Act of
Congress are within the protection of the federal courts. Rights
not derived from them are left exclusively to the protection of the
states. The privilege of participating in interscholastic
athletics
83
must be deemed to fall within the latter category.
The response of the state courts has been equally consistent.
25.
26.
U.S. 503
27.
28.
29.

They gen-

Id.
See note 23 supra. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393
(1969).

See note 15 supra.
Id.
See notes 6 and 19 supra.

30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

31. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
32. Dunham v.Pulsifer, 312 F.Supp. 411, 417 (D.Ver. 1970).
33. See note 16 supra.
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erally refuse to recognize any right to participate in extra-curricular activities. They find, as one court expressed, that "the right to attend public
schools and receive an education cannot properly be said to include inter'34
scholastic sports and games."
Despite this theory, both Reed and Haas argue that that the right
the female students are asserting is not simply the right to swim or the right
to golf. Rather, they argue that their right is the right to be treated the
same as boys where a program for swimming or golfing has been provided
for boys only. 35 This is consistent with the reasoning in Brown which did
not find that the Negro children had a right to be educated, but found that
under the fourteenth amendment they had a right to be educated equally
with non-Negro children where the educational program was sponsored by
the state. The analogy to the Brown holding is striking, as the plaintiffs
did not seek to establish a program for female athletes, instead they sought
to be eligible for a program of athletic activity provided only for boys.
This argument was not considered in Bucha, as the IHSA amended it's bylaws to permit interscholastic programs for both males and females immediately following the commencement of the suit. Thus, in Bucha, the question
of whether the right to participate in interscholastic athletics is a fundamental
right became moot.
II.

SEX CLASSIFICATIONS ARE NOT INVIDIOUS
DISCRIMINATION

Through the gradual evolution of judicial precedent various bases for
legislative classifications have been determined to be inherently suspect as
invidious discrimination, that is, by their very nature unreasonable and in
violation of Constitutional or legislative provisions. These categories of
7
36
judicially determined invidious discrimination are race, national origin,
38
39
alienage, and poverty.
A classification predicated on any one of these
factors is so inherently offensive to our Constitutional guarantees that it
immediately dictates active judicial scrutiny. The state action can only be
upheld upon proof of a compelling state interest.
Sex has not been placed in this invidious category, and three recent
cases implicitly indicate the reluctance of the Supreme Court to make this
41
40
determination. In Alexander v. Louisiana and In re Stanley v. Illinois,
more than one constitutional question was presented and the Court followed
34. State ex rel. Lawrence v. Indiana High School Athletic Association, 240 Ind.
124, 162 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1959); Bruce v. South Carolina High School League, 189
S.E.2d 817 (S.C. 1972).
35. See notes 18 and 20 supra.
36. Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
37. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
38. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
39. Harper v. Va. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
40. 405 U.S. 625 (1971).

41. 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
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its "usual custom of avoiding decisions of constitutional issues unnecessary
to the decision of the cases before us." '42 In Alexander, a Negro appealed
a criminal conviction because women and Negroes had been excluded from
the jury. In In re Stanley, an unwed father was denied custody of his
children without the notice and hearing provided by statute for unwed
mothers. Although both plaintiffs argued that the sex classification in each
case should be judicially determined to be an invidious discrimination, the
of racial discrimination and
Court disposed of Alexander on the basis
43
Stanley on the basis of denial of due process.
The most definitive statement of the Court regarding this issue is the
opinion in Reed v. Reed.4 4 The Court was presented with an Idaho statute
that automatically gave preference to fathers over mother where both filed
letters for appointment as administrators of a decedent's estate. The announced intent of this statute was to minimize litigation in this area. 4 5
In reaching its decision the Court applied the permissive test of a rational
basis for the classification reasonably related to the object of the statute.
The Court further noted that the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit
the states from treating different classes of persons in different ways. This
test was enunciated:
The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest
on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.4 6,
The Supreme Court did not determine that the sex based classification was
an invidious discrimination. The Court rather determined that the sex
classification had no reasonable relation to the objective of the Idaho statute.
Reed v. Reed inescapably indicates that the correct standard in reviewing
sex based classifications is the permissive, rational basis and reasonable relationship test.
Classification based on sex has deep roots in our legislative history.
Sex classifications founded on physiological or psychological differences
have been judicially accepted as rational in cases protecting women from
working long hours, 47 participating in hazardous activities, 48 earning low
42. 405 U.S. at 633.
43. Id. at 634. , Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring. "I am convinced we should
also reach the constitutional question of the exclusion of women from jury service.
The issue was squarely presented, it has been thoroughly argued and is of recurring
importance. The Court purports to follow our usual custom of avoiding unnecessary
constitutional issues, but that cannot be the sole rationale for both questions are of
constitutional importance. We could as easily say that deciding the constitutionality
of excluding women from juries renders it unnecessary to reach the question of racial
exclusion."
44. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
45. Id. at 76.
46. Id.
47. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
48. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
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wages, 49 serving in the armed forces, 50 and registering for mandatory jury
duty. 5 1 These roots, however, are being cut away by equalizing legislation
such as the Civil Rights Act of 196452 which prohibits sex discrimination in
job hiring in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification. In
Illinois, the Fair Employment Practices Act has been amended to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex. 53 As a result, courts and government
agencies can no longer mechanically accept sex classification in employment as rational and thereby constitutionally valid. They must investigate
to determine if the sex classification is bona fide and rests on a basis of
54
difference that is real and tangible, not specious or fanciful
This critical attitude has been expanded upon by the Supreme Court of
California. In Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 55 it became the first court in the nation
to declare that in dealing with a woman's right to be employed, sex must be
treated as an invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amendment
guarantees. Thus, the sex classification or denial of employment opportunity can only stand where a compelling state interest necessitates it. The
California court reasoned that sex, like race, is a highly visible characteristic
beyond an individual's control. Large numbers of males and females are
stereotyped without regard for the individual's ability to perform and contribute to society. In California "the pedestal upon which women have
been placed has been revealed, upon closer inspection, to be a cage." 5 6
The impetus of Sail'er Inn has prompted courts to reject the traditional
sex based classifications in various areas, including the disparity of criminal
sentences between men and women, 57 separate male and female employment
classified sections in the newspapers,18 and different male and female employment benefits. 59 Although sex classifications are not inherently suspect
49. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
50. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
51. United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (D.C.N.Y. 1968).
52. 42 U.S.C. 2000 .(1964): It shall be unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . .this shall not apply if there is a bona fide occupational qualification ...
53. Il1. Rev. Stat. Ch. 48, §§ 851; see also Illinois Constitution, Article I,
§§ 18: The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex by the state or its units of local government and school districts; and Illinois
Legislative Council, Springfield, File 7-992 (RB:pb), (Oct. 21, 1971)

house bill for equal protection of laws in school districts.

at 4, defeated

54. See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, 308 F. Supp. 1253
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); McCrimmon v. Daley, 418 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1969).
55. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).
56, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 554.

57. U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Common-

wealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).

58. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 4 Pa.

Cmwlth. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
59. Bravo v. Board of Education for the City of Chicago, 345 F. Supp. 155

(1972).
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as invidious discrimination in the vast majority of jurisdictions, a judicial
trend is emerging that emphasizes the necessity for thoughtful and thorough
examination of the evidence upon which the classification is grounded. Mr.
Justice Holmes said "the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a fictitious
equality where there is a real difference", 6 0 but our democratic system will
no longer tolerate the acceptance of a fictitious difference where there is a
real equality.
11.

SEX CLASSIFICATIONS:

THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS

Widely accepted assumptions predicated on physiological and psychological
differences between the sexes form the basis for the traditional sex based
classifications. These assumptions have especially influenced legislation
affecting young males and females. For example, until recently, many states
had a three year dispartiy between males and females for the age of majority; 61 most states had a two year dispartiy for the determination of
persons in need of supervision; 62 and some states had a one year disparity for
the benefits of their juvenile court proceedings. 63 These disparities were
founded on the assumption that females mature at a faster rate than males,
but are now being eliminated as the result of empirical evidence.64 Similarly,
in the Seventh Circuit, male high school students have successfully argued
that separate male and female dress codes preventing only the males from
wearing long hair styles was a violation of equal protection concepts. 6 5
However, the physiological assumptions upon which the female athletic cases are predicated have not been repudiated. The Bucha court was
forced to weigh and evaluate the physiological evidence indicative of a
rational basis for separate male and female teams. A wealth of evidence of
varying weight and credibility was educed for the Bucha trial. The defendant
introduced affidavits from coaches and educators favoring the separate athletic program. The court took judicial notice that "at the pinnacle of all
sporting contests, the Olympic games, the men's times in each event are
consistently better than the women's." 6 6 In addition, the court noted that
the times of the two male swimmers sent to the state championship contest
from the Hinsdale Township High School were better than those ever
recorded by Ms. Bucha. However, this type of evidence was severely
questioned in Haas where the court indicated:
Such evidence cannot support a conclusion that the male sex is
athletically superior. An objective observer could not determine
60. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912).
61. Jacobson v. Lenhart, 30 Ill.
2d 225, 195 N.E.2d 638 (1964).
62. A v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
63. People v. Pardo, 47 Ill.
2d 420, 265 N.E.2d 656 (1970).
64. Ill.Rev. Stat. ch. 37 § 701-2 (uniform age for Juvenile Court Act); Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 3 §§ 131 (uniform age of majority).
65. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
66. See note 6 supra.
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which of two opposing armies was superior by examining the
strongest and bravest soldier in each. For constitutional purposes,
the investigation would necessarily focus on the causes of any dif67
ferential in relative performance of male and female athletes.
The evidence the Bucha opinion relied upon most heavily was presented
by an expert medical witness at the Brendan trial.6 8 The evidence indicated
that men are taller than women and stronger by reason of greater muscle
mass. Men have larger hearts than women and their deeper breathing
capacity enables them to utilize oxygen more efficiently than women. They
run faster than women because of the construction of the pelvic area. 69
Reed, Brendan, and Haas were not class actions and the courts chose to
ignore this evidence. This is particularly important as the named plaintiffs
in those cases presented impressive credentials on the athletic field which
clearly brought them beyond the scope of average female ability.70 Each
court noted that the female plaintiff was not within the perameter of the
average female athlete. However, Bucha was argued as a class action, and
medical testimony as indicated above was strongly probative for that court
which evaluated the ability of all female athletes, not the ability of the exceptional ones.
Juxtaposed with this, evidence of a rational basis for separate male
and female programs is medical and sociological evidence that there is no
rational basis for the separate programs. The plaintiff, in Bucha, presented
evidence of a trial study of a male-female integrated athletic program in
New York, which was presented to the American Medical Association Committee on the Medical Aspects of Sport. 71 This New York study was
instituted as the result of a suit by a female athlete seeking to participate on
the varsity team which was limited to males only by the rules of the New
York Board of Regents. The decision in the action was delayed until
sufficient research could be gathered to form the basis of a factual determination.
The study was conducted in one hundred New York high schools for
a sixteen month period from March 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970. Female
athletes were permitted to participate on male interscholastic sports teams.
The experiment was closely controlled and the participants were subjected
to regular medical and psychological examinations. The results of the
67. Supra note 20, at 503.
68. See note 19 supra.
69. But see, Hay "Sex Determination in Putative Female Athletes" 221 J.A.M.A.
at 998 (August, 1972); Brown, "Effects of Cross-country Running on Preadolescent

Girls", Research Laboratory, V.A. Hospital, Livermore, California; Zaharieva, "Olympic
Participation by Women, Effects on Pregnancy and Childbirth", 221 J.A.M.A. (August,

1972).
70. Supra note 19, at 1226; Supra note 18, at 263; Supra note 20, at 496.

71. G. Grover, "Girls on Boys' Athletic Teams: Report of an Experiment by the
New York State Education Department" (1969), Endorsed by the American Medical
Association Committee on the Medical Aspects of Sport.
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study revealed no adverse effects on the students. A comprehensive survey
indicated that 84% of the male team members, 99% of the female team
members, 93% of the team members parents, and 86% of the coaches were
in favor of the continuation and expansion of the integrated mixed athletic
program.7 2 After the submission of this empirical data to the New York
Board of Regents, a mixed athletic program in noncontact sports was
adopted.7 3 This mixed varsity program has continued in conjunction with
separate male and female programs. 74 The Bucha court found that this
conflict of evidence regarding the results of mixed athletic competition
mandated judicial restraint in the area "where even the experts disagree."'7 5
In attempting to place Bucha in context with the other three decisions
it is necessary to underscore two essential factual distinctions. Bucha was
a class action, and the testimony and evidence regarding female athletes as a
class was determinative. Secondly, Bucha was decided after the IHSA bylaw prohibiting female interscholastic competition had been amended. As
there was a female athletic program available for Ms. Bucha (an opportunity that the plaintiffs in Reed, Brendan, and Haas had been denied) the
rational basis for the classification was acceptable. This reasoning is
explained in Haas:
By denying females the opportunity to participate on varsity athletic teams in interscholastic competition the rule in effect prohibits
females from participating in interscholastic athletics altogether.
Although the difference in athletic ability is a justifiable reason for
the separation of male and female athletic programs, that 76justification does not exist when only one program is provided.
Because Illinois provides two programs, male and female, the IHSA
was able to advance a valid justification for denying females eligibility for
male teams. The effect of permitting the mixed competition would be to
amalgamate both teams with females eligible for the male teams and vice
versa. The predictable result of this combined team would be male dominance. It would operate to discourage and exclude females from beneficial athletic activities. This argument cannot be advanced where there
is only one program available for boys only, but it is highly persuasive where
there are two programs.
IV.

THE EMERGING TREND

The principal case, Bucha v. Illinois High School Association, is consistent with judicial precedent in accepting as rational the sex based classi72. Id. at 10.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 14: these recommendations and changes should in no way diminish
or be substituted for girls interscholastic athletic teams.
75. Supra note 6, at 75.
76. Supra note 20, at 496.
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fication of the IHSA by-laws. But Reed, Brendan, and Haas are noteworthy in their departure from this traditional approach. All three found
that the physiological differences between young men and women provide a
rational foundation for separate high school athletic programs. Yet all
three carved out exceptions to the rational classification for Peggy Brendan,
Debbie Reed, and Johnell Haas. The effect of finding the classification
rational in fact, but irrational in application to the named plaintiffs, is to
define a subgroup of exceptional female athletes. These three courts clearly
reject the traditional statistical approach to sex based classifications, and
this rejection can have far reaching repercussions. For example, if courts
were to look beyond statistical compilations regarding the longevity, size,
strength, and occupational preference of women they would be free to
carefully reevaluate or repudiate discrepancies between males and females
78
educational institutions 79
in life insurance rates, 77 weightlifting regulations,
and occupational opportunities.80 Undoubtedly exceptional persons, both
male and female, have suffered from the statistical approach to sex classifications. The existence of male octogenearians, female weightlifters, male
secretaries, and female wrestlers has been consistently ignored by judicial
review.
The three decisions discussed above represent judicial foresight in
admitting both the exception and the rule. Title VII and its "exception"
where there is a bona fide occupational qualification, and the exceptions
delineated by Haas, Brednan and Reed represent judicial and legislative
attempts to save the sex classifications from being overinclusive. The
remedial approach, the construction of a subclassification to which the
general proposition does not apply, is a clear judicial and legislative recognition of individual differences and rights. Certainly this exception approach
would be unnecessary if the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, or if the
Supreme Court makes a determination that sex is an invidious form of
discrimination. But it may be argued that the exception approach deals
more equitably with each individual, male and female, than would the
two alternatives.
CANDACE FABRI

77. See Kanowitz, "Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law", 48 Neb. L. Rev. 131 (1968).
78. See Waldman, "Changes in Labor Force Activity of Women", 93 Mo. Lab.
Rev. 10 (June 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48 § 851; see generally U.S.E.E.O.C., 29 C.F.R. ch. 14 § 1604.
79. See Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970); accord Heaton v.
Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); but see Kirsten v. Board of Directors
of University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
80. State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956); Calzadilla v. Dooley,
286 N.Y.S.2d 510, 29 A.2d 152 (1968).

